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Cybersecurity in the 21st century is constantly evolving and changing in order to 
meet today’s threats. The maritime industry in the United States is no different than any 
other organization that can fall under a cyber-attack. Currently, no major cyber threat has 
threatened the maritime community in the United States or national security. Recent 
attempts to disrupt the flow of the maritime industry, however, legitimize fears over 
maritime cyber-attacks.  
The United States has significant shortfalls in maritime cybersecurity. This thesis 
evaluates U.S. ports and strategies against those of the European Union to examine the 
impact of cyber issues on the United States and its national security. The maritime 
community is not cyber resilient and has no specific guidelines or responses in place to 
deter or prevent a major cyber-attack on the United States. For the United States to 
maintain its cyber resilience and normal operations at its ports, the global maritime 
community must address the issues together to maintain global maritime dominance. 
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I. MARITIME CYBERSECURITY: THE NEW 
RULES OF THE ROAD 
America’s economic prosperity, national security, and our individual 
liberties depend on our commitment to securing cyberspace and 
maintaining an open,  interoperable, secure,  and reliable Internet. Our 
critical infrastructure continues to be at risk from threats in cyberspace, 
and our economy is harmed by the theft of our intellectual property. 
Although the threats are serious and they constantly  evolve, I believe that 
if we address them effectively, we can ensure that the Internet remains an 
engine for economic growth and a platform for the free exchange of ideas. 
—President Barack Obama1  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION  
Cybersecurity is of grave importance to the maritime industry. As a recent article 
in the Naval Institute Proceedings noted, “maritime shipping moves 90-94 percent of 
world trade.”2 With a majority of the world’s goods traveling through sea lanes, it is 
crucial for members of the maritime industry to understand the risks associated with the 
maritime cyber domain. This thesis evaluates the weaknesses of maritime cybersecurity 
through case studies and recent events to determine vulnerabilities in the maritime 
community. In particular, this thesis examines the following questions: to what extent do 
cyber vulnerabilities of non–U.S. flagged commercial vessels constitute a threat to U.S. 
national security, and what should be done to address those vulnerabilities? 
B. IMPORTANCE  
The maritime industry is reactive in setting standards and procedures based on 
catastrophic events. To cite a famous example, on April 15, 1912, the “unsinkable” RMS 
Titanic collided with an iceberg during her first underway from Southampton, United 
                                                 
1 White House.gov, “Foreign Policy: Cybersecurity,” accessed April 8, 2016, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cybersecurity. 
2 Don Walsh, “Oceans - Maritime Cyber Security: Shoal Water Ahead?” Proceedings Magazine 14, 
no. 7 (2015): 1–2, http://www.U.S.Ni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015–07/oceans-maritime-cyber-
security-shoal-water-ahead. 
 2
Kingdom, while traveling to New York City.3 Believed by many to be indestructible, the 
Titanic departed on her maiden voyage with a minimum of lifeboats and lifejackets for 
the crew and passengers; the lack of safety equipment contributed to more than 1,500 
deaths.4 In response, the international community in 1913 came together for the Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention to set international shipping practices and regulations 
for seafaring vessels.5 Responding to the Titanic disaster, in 1914, maritime leaders 
worldwide mandated safety requirements, including durability, loading, capacity, and 
specific lifeboat building requirements, and required every person aboard have access to 
a lifejacket due to the negligence of the maritime community to spot these problems from 
the beginning.6  
Today, the maritime industry has what will be referred to in this thesis as “Titanic 
syndrome.” In the context of cyber threats, this means that the international community 
usually acts only in response to extraordinary events that place states in cyber panic. 
Maritime cyber-attacks are happening more frequently than members of the maritime 
community believe because of the number of unreported and undetected attacks.7 
Although research has suggested the maritime industry is vulnerable to cyber-attacks, 
very little has been done to prevent or deter them. During a presentation to the Naval 
Postgraduate School student body in March 2015, Vice Chief of Naval Operations 
Admiral Michelle Howard stressed the growing concerns the United States Navy (USN) 
has regarding maritime cybersecurity and its potential threats. Admiral Howard stresses 
the importance again during an interview with the Navy Times:  
                                                 
3 History, “This Day in History: April 15,” accessed February 4, 2016, http://www.history.com/this-
day-in-history/titanic-sinks. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Dan Bender, “How the Sinking of the Titanic Changed the World,” Coast Guard Compass, Official 
Blog of the U.S. Coast Guard, April 14, 2010, last Accessed February 4, 2016, 
http://coastguard.DoDlive.mil/2010/04/how-the-sinking-of-the-titanic-changed-the-world/. 
6 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, accessed April 25, 2016, 
http://www.ifrc.org/docs/idrl/I456EN.pdf.  
7 “Maritime Cyber-Risks: Virtual Pirates at Large on the Cyber Seas,” CyberKeel, October 15, 2105, 
http://www.cyberkeel.com/images/pdf-files/Whitepaper.pdf. 
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My perspective is that everyone is the cyber, active, reserve, and civilians. 
We operate and live in this domain. There's not a person in the 
Department of the Navy who probably doesn't have a desktop, doesn't deal 
with Microsoft products, Excel spreadsheets, databases, transference of 
data, email, and so we are all in this domain.8 
The concerns of the USN are valid as state actors, such as China and Russia, have been 
advancing their capabilities for cyber warfare.9 These cyber-attacks, therefore, trickle 
down into the merchant sector, which has fewer capabilities and less resilience to defend 
against such attacks.  
In order for the maritime industry to remain successful, the industry must be 
forward thinking to become more resilient through standardized plans and procedures. 
Despite outside research, however, very little has been done to address recent attacks, 
equipment vulnerabilities, or needed technological development. Though challenges in 
today’s cyber domain have led to denial of services and, thus, to a disruption in the 
supply chain, the maritime industry still has no global standards in place for maritime 
cybersecurity.  
Government agencies invest in maritime cybersecurity and the protection of 
critical U.S. infrastructure. However, the job of protecting America's maritime cyber-
interests has become difficult because many of the ships in today’s maritime fleet that 
enter the United States are non–U.S. flagged vessels and crewed by foreigners.10 In 2004, 
the U.S. Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration Office of Financial and 
Rate Approvals drew attention to “the nationalities and size of the crews of foreign-flag 
                                                 
8 Sam Fellman, “VCNO Michelle Howard pushes for cyber vigilance, more women in the ranks,” 
Navy Times. April 12, 2015, http://www.navytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2015/04/12/vcno-
michelle-howard-cyber-vigilance-more-women-navy-ranks/70774264/.  
9 Arshad Mohammed, Matt Spetalnick, and Mark Hosenball, “Exclusive: U.S. Weighs Sanction 
Russia as well as China in Cyber Attacks,” Reuters, September 1, 2015, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/01/us-usa-cybersecurity-russia-exclusive-
idUSKCN0R12FE20150901#0wKGvOQlmoE6SXDF.97. 
10 “Foreign-Flag Crewing Practices: A Review of Crewing Practices in U.S.–Foreign Ocean Cargo 




cargo vessels calling at ports in the United States.”11 The number of foreign mariners 
entering out ports daily raises red flags for cyber awareness and training. Released in 
2006, the report analyzes the top five port concentration areas in the United States: 
Houston, Los Angeles/Long Beach, Miami, Newark/New York, and New Orleans.12 The 
top five flags for ships entering these ports are in numerical order, starting with the most 
prevalent: Panama, Liberia, Cyprus, Malta, and the Bahamas. The top five nationalities of 
crewmembers on the commercial ships entering the ports are in numerical order starting 
with the most prevalent: Philippines (36.6%), China (9.3%), India (8.1%), Ukraine 
(5.4%), and Russia (4.9%).13 The report concludes, “crewmembers from 123 different 
countries were found on foreign-flagged vessels calling U.S. ports.”14 With so many 
different stakeholders and nations involved, regulating the vessels entering U.S. ports 
under a U.S. cybersecurity standard will be difficult to enforce. For the United States to 
be successful in implementing procedures to protect its interests, the international 
community must put forth cybersecurity deliverables that are both agreeable and 
beneficial to the global maritime community.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS  
This thesis evaluates different parts of the maritime community through historical 
contexts, including legislation, governance, and recent reviews, to demonstrate the 
seriousness of maritime cyber threats for national security. The maritime domain is a vast 
network of different institutions and players that must work in unison to prevent and deter 
maritime cyber-attacks. Many researchers have found that there are significant 
cybersecurity weaknesses within the maritime community, which the community itself 
does not take seriously enough.  
                                                 
11 “Foreign-Flag Crewing Practices,” U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration, 3.  
12 Ibid, 6. 
13 Ibid, 9–10.  
14 Ibid, 10. 
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The primary hypothesis of this thesis is that the maritime community in the 
United States takes maritime cybersecurity for granted, leading to serious gaps in U.S. 
national security. Despite countless written articles, the maritime community has taken a 
limited approach toward defending the cyber realm.  
The secondary hypothesis of this thesis is that if we are to have a resilient 
maritime domain, the United States must ratify worldwide maritime cyber-domain 
standards and convince world leadership to ratify such standards in protecting maritime 
interests. The security of the global commercial fleet and port infrastructure relies on the 
international community to adopt legislation that regulates technology both afloat and 
ashore. Industry success means the international community must work more vigorously 
to enforce a minimum level of cybersecurity. Global cybersecurity requirements led by 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) relieve the burden placed on entities in 
the United States. In return, the United States can focus its efforts on maintaining 
international laws. The potential issue with this hypothesis is that it requires the 
international community to fund and regulate programs that all maritime countries agree 
upon for international maritime cybersecurity.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this literature review is to establish a baseline for understanding 
maritime cybersecurity policies and literature specific to the major research question. Not 
only do experts in cybersecurity fear that U.S. ports are suffering from negligent 
cybersecurity but also that ships entering the United States are at risk because of 
advancements in technology.15 Experts from the Heritage Foundation, the United States 
Naval Institute (USNI), the United States Coast Guard (USCG), CyberKeel, the European 
Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), and other maritime-concerned parties of the private and public sectors 
agree that action must be taken to prevent the potential crisis of a severe maritime cyber-
                                                 
15 Thad Odderstol, “C-Cubed: Increasing Cyber Resilience, Awareness, and Managing Risk,” Coast 
Guard Proceedings 71, no. 4 (2014–2015): 12, http://uscgproceedings.epubxp.com/i/436751-win-2015.  
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attack. In order to determine whether U.S. national security assets are at risk, it is crucial 
to define maritime cybersecurity and identify responsibility for maritime cybersecurity in 
the United States in terms of national security. 
1. Defining Maritime Cybersecurity, Attacks, and Domain 
The maritime community has yet to establish a global definition for “maritime 
cybersecurity.” This thesis accepts Merriam-Webster's definition of cybersecurity: 
“measures taken to protect a computer or computer system (as on the Internet) against 
unauthorized access or attack.”16 This thesis defines maritime cybersecurity as measures 
taken to protect network and computer assets both on ships, terminals, ports, and all 
computerized equipment supporting maritime operations. A cyber-attack is any "attempt 
to damage, disrupt, or gain unauthorized access to a computer system, or electronic 
communications network.”17 Cyber-attacks pertain to the same computer assets on ships, 
terminals, ports, and all computerized equipment supporting maritime operations. The 
Maritime domain is defined as “all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, 
or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related 
activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances.”18 Resilience 
is defined as “an ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change.”19 For 
the purposes of this thesis, maritime cyber resilience means the ability of the maritime 
community to recover after a cyber-attack.  
                                                 
16 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, s.v. “Cybersecurity,” accessed April 8, 2016, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/cybersecurity.  
17 Dictionary.com, s.v. “Cyber-attack,” accessed April 8, 2016, 
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/cyber-attack. No official international or U.S. definition is available as 
of May 2016.  
18 “National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness for the National Strategy for Maritime 
Security,” Department of Homeland Security, October 2005, i, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/HSPD_MDAPlan_0.pdf.  
19 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, s.v. “Resilience,” accessed May 2, 2016, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/resilience.  
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2. United States Maritime Cybersecurity Governance  
The world’s reliance on technology is expanding every day, and the ability to 
infiltrate computer-based networks is expanding. The events of September 11, 2001 will 
forever change the way the United States handles security operations. Congress passed 
the Maritime Transportation and Security Act (MTSA) in 2002 and the Security and 
Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act in 2006. Both of these acts mandated specific 
requirements for physical security at ports including patrol boats, waterside security, and 
entrance control points. Although legislation was put in place to secure ports in the 
United States, the cyber realm has remained practically untouched.20 
President Obama signed two different policies to ensure critical infrastructure in 
the United States is protected against the evolving cyber threat: Presidential Policy 
Directive (PPD) 21, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience and Executive Order 
(EO) 13,636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.21 According to Danielle 
Bivens, PPD 21 “guides efforts to secure, strengthen, and maintain the nation’s critical 
infrastructure and directs critical infrastructure owners and operators to work together 
and share responsibility.”22 The overarching principle of PPD 21 is the ability to allocate 
federal, state, and private entities working in unison in defense of maritime infrastructure. 
The ability of information-sharing among key members in the maritime industry makes 
the response and recovery time more sustainable for all parties involved and allows port 
operations to return to normal. PPD 21 also defines a sector-specific agency (SSA) as an 
agency responsible for critical infrastructure. PPD 21 establishes responsibly of cyber 
threats domestically: 
The FBI also conducts domestic collection, analysis, and dissemination of 
cyber threat information, and shall be responsible for the operation of the 
National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF). The NCIJTF 
                                                 
20 “10 Years after 9/11, Security Still a Top Priority of U.S. Ports,” Maritime Executive, September 2, 
2011, http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/10-years-after-9–11-security-still-a-top-priority-of-u-s-
ports. 
21 Danielle Bivens, “Maritime Governance: Designed with security in mind,” Coast Guard 
Proceedings 71, no. 4 (2014–2015): 6, http://uscgproceedings.epubxp.com/i/436751-win-2015.  
22 Ibid.  
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serves as a multi-agency national focal point for coordinating, integrating, 
and sharing pertinent  information related to cyber threat investigations, 
with representation from DHS, the Intelligence Community (IC), the 
Department of Defense (DOD), and other agencies as appropriate. 
The Department of Commerce (DOC), in collaboration with DHS and 
other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall engage private 
sector, research, academic, and government organizations to improve 
security for technology and tools related to cyber-based systems, and 
promote the development of other efforts related to critical infrastructure 
to enable the timely availability of industrial products, materials, and 
services to meet homeland security requirements.23 
 
PPD 21 establishes the basic framework for overall security, both physical and cyber, for 
the United States' critical infrastructure. EO 13636 specifically focuses on cybersecurity 
as it pertains to critical infrastructure: 
Executive Order 13636 … calls for various actions to improve the 
cybersecurity of critical infrastructure. These include developing a 
cybersecurity framework; increasing the volume, timeliness, and quality of 
cyber threat information shared with the U.S. private sector; considering 
prioritized actions within each sector to promote cybersecurity; and 
identifying critical infrastructure for which a cyber incident could have a 
catastrophic impact.24 
 
Prior to PPD 21 and Executive Order 12636, President George W. Bush signed 
Presidential Directive 12, Maritime Security Policy, which outlined policy objectives and 
guidelines for U.S. maritime interests.25 The policy set by President Bush gave way to the 
National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). The purpose of the 
MDA plan, as outlined by Danielle Bevins, is for key management and security managers 
                                                 
23 Presidential Policy Directive 21, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, February 12, 2013, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-
infrastructure-security-and-resil.  
24 Gregory C. Wilhusen, “Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Needs to Enhance Efforts 
to Address Port Cybersecurity,” United States Government Accountability Office, October 8, 2015, 2, 
http://gao.gov/assets/680/672973.pdf.  
25 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
(HSPD) 13, December 21, 2004, 1, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd41.pdf.  
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in various parts of the maritime community to increase their awareness of potential 
cyber-attacks on ports in the United States through the following measures: 
Enhancing maritime domain transparency to detect, deter, and disrupt 
threats, as early as possible;  
Enabling accurate, dynamic, and confident decisions and responses to the 
full spectrum of maritime threats and challenges through information 
sharing;  
Facilitating partnerships to promote maritime domain information sharing, 
safeguarding, capacity building, and integration;  
Preserving our [U.S.] rights, freedoms of navigation and overflight, and 
uses of the sea and airspace recognized under international law, while 
promoting lawful, continuous, and efficient commerce flow.26 
Although these requirements were established in 2005, many members of the maritime 
community do not meet the requirements out of ignorance or failure to prioritize 
cybersecurity as a major national threat.  
E. SUMMARY AND THESIS OVERVIEW  
Today, the maritime community as a whole is insecure due to its own ignorance 
about maritime cybersecurity. Potential actors can harm the U.S. maritime community 
without notice and with the ability to escape unpunished. This thesis argues that the 
question is not when will a maritime cyber-attack take place, but how bad will the attack 
be? Even more broadly, the United States is not ready to recover or respond from a 
serious cyber-attack at its ports. Although legislation has passed on maritime 
cybersecurity, little has been done about enforcing a unified standard of protection. This 
thesis examines these threats and recommends that the maritime community rethink its 
posture toward cybersecurity in the 21st century.  
This thesis uses a comparative approach in examining cybersecurity in the 
maritime domain of the United States. It consists of five chapters.  
                                                 
26 Bivens, “Maritime Governance,” 7.  
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Chapter II presents recent attacks and incidents affecting the maritime industry, a 
review of the actors behind a maritime cyber-attack, and the seriousness of a cyber-attack 
for U.S. national defense.  
Chapter III evaluates six different ports in the United States that were initially 
examined in a Brookings study and illustrates the vulnerabilities in our maritime cyber 
infrastructure.  
Chapter IV evaluates the roles of the federal, state, and local actors who are 
responsible for the overall resilience of cybersecurity at U.S. ports.  
Chapter V concludes by examining the threat of a maritime cyber-attack on the 











II. MARITIME CYBERSECURITY: RECENT ATTACKS 
AND INCIDENTS  
I am convinced that there are only two types of companies: those that have 
been hacked and those that will be. And even they are converging into one 
category: companies that have been hacked and will be hacked again.  
—former Director FBI Robert S. Mueller III27  
Why do individuals or states conduct maritime cyber-attacks? According to Lars 
Jensen, an expert in maritime cybersecurity, an attacker's motivation ranges from 
financially to smuggling in contraband to stealing company secrets from different marine 
industries. 28 Afloat and ashore, the maritime industry operates sensitive equipment that 
is easily accessible through the Internet. Many users of navigational or logistic software, 
for example, have necessary skills and schooling to operate the equipment, but when 
faced with technical issues, these same operators usually need information-technology 
(IT) support.29 Lacking certain IT skillsets leaves operators defenseless and companies 
vulnerable to losing information, equipment, or profit.  
CyberKeel, a maritime cyber-security firm located in Denmark, argues that 
maritime cyber defense should not be taken lightly. CyberKeel believes that every 
operator aboard a ship or terminal30 needs to be aware of the potential threats from cyber-
attacks to recognize an arising issue.31 A white paper published by CyberKeel outlines 
the thoughts of top-tier decision makers regarding maritime cybersecurity: 
                                                 
27 Robert S. Mueller III, “Combating Threats in the Cyber World: Outsmarting Terrorists, Hackers, 
and Spies," Speech for the RSA Cybersecurity Conference, San Francisco, CA, March 1, 2012, 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/combating-threats-in-the-cyber-world-outsmarting-terrorists-hackers-
and-spies.  
28 Lars Jensen, “Challenges in Maritime Cyber-Resilience,” Technology Innovation Management 
Review 5, no 4. (April 2015): 37, http://timreview.ca/article/889.  
29 “Maritime Cyber-Risks,” CyberKeel. 
30  A terminal is any part of a port or shipping facility that handles shipping containers or cargo.  
31 “Maritime Cyber-Risks,” CyberKeel, 3. 
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Cybersecurity is a technical matter largely delegated to the IT manager, or 
the CIO, and is not something materially involving the CEO, CCO, COO, 
CFO or the HR Manager. A belief that the cyber threats are chiefly 
theoretical in nature, usually linked to a doubt as to whether there is 
anyone with a genuine motivation to perform cyberattacks against their 
own particular maritime company.32  
This chapter demonstrates how serious the cyber threat is toward the maritime industry. 
First, it reviews several of the most significant, recent maritime cyber-attacks. Second, 
this chapter reviews maritime technologies and how they pose a risk. Third, it examines 
the players who are responsible for the cyber threat. Finally, this chapter synthesizes 
evidence from port closures in the United States and testimonies to Congress to 
demonstrate the repercussion of the cyber threat in today’s maritime domain. 
A. RECENT MARITIME CYBER-ATTACKS 
Cyber-attacks on the industry are taking place; whether companies want to 
acknowledge these attacks is a different story. Cyber threats and vulnerabilities may 
include exploiting banking records, accessing logistical software, as well as taking 
control of ships’ navigation and engine controls. This section examines four documented 
attacks: the cyber-attack on the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, the Icefog virus, 
the first case of ghost shipping, and inadvertent network breaches on mobile offshore 
drilling units (MODUs). 
1. The Islamic Republic of Iran 
With multilateral sanctions placed on Iranian exports by the international 
community, shipping plays an important part in keeping Iran’s economy alive. In August 
2011, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), an Iranian state-owned 
shipping company, fell victim to a cyber-attack.33 Lars Jenson, founder of CyberKeel, 
reported, “The attacks damaged all the data related to rates, loading, cargo number, date 
                                                 
32 “Maritime Cyber-Risks,” CyberKeel, 4. 
33 Yeganeh Torbati and Jonathan Saul, “Iran’s Top Cargo Shipping Line Says Sanctions Damage 
Mounting,” Reuters, October 22, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-sanctions-shipping-
idUSBRE89L10X20121022. 
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and place … resulting in severe financial losses.”34 According to Mohammad Hussein 
Dajmar, Managing Director of IRISL, the cyber-attacks took cargo and general shipping 
information from the line, and because of the severity of the attack, Dajmar believes 
outside governments were involved.35 The amount of data lost from this cyber-attack 
made it almost impossible for Iranian stevedores to account for containers placed on 
ships or stored pier-side without having to individually verify all twenty-foot equivalent 
units (TEU). Although Dajmar did not say how long it took to restore his company to 
normal operations, he did admit “there was considerable damage.”36  
A separate cyber-attack took place in Iran in October 2012. Officials from Tehran 
reported that cyber-attacks had targeted communication networks established on offshore 
oil and gas platforms in the Persian Gulf.37 With Iranian exported oil peaking at 79 
percent of its gross domestic product in 2014, the Iranian government and its investors 
have worried that any shut-down to oil networks will have catastrophic repercussions on 
the Iranian economy.38 Cyber-attacks and threats on Iranian critical infrastructure have 
pushed Tehran to invest heavily in cyber defense and capabilities.39 Since 2012, Tehran 
has not made public any other cyber-attacks against its maritime components.  
2. “Icefog”  
In 2013, Internet security conglomerate Kaspersky Labs released evidence of 
ongoing phishing attacks since early 2001 on Japanese and South Korean assets. 
According to the company, targets of the phishing included “governmental institutions, 
military contractors, maritime and shipbuilding groups, telecom operators, industrial and 
                                                 
34 “Maritime Cyber-Risks,” CyberKeel, 6.  
35 Ibid. 
36 Torbati and Saul, “Iran’s Top Cargo Shipping Line.”  
37 “Iran’s Offshore Platforms Become Target,” Maritime Executive.  
38 Daniel Workman, “Iran’s Top 10 Exports,” World’s Top Exports, August 29, 2015, 
http://www.worldstopexports.com/irans-top-10-exports/; MarEx. “Iran’s Offshore Platforms Become 
Target to Recent Cyber Attacks.” The Maritime Executive. October 9, 2012. http://maritime-
executive.com/article/iran-s-offshore-platforms-become-target-of-recent-cyber-attacks. 
39Bill Gert, “Iran Rapidly Building Cyber Warfare Capabilities,” The Washington Free Beacon, May 
12, 2015, http://freebeacon.com/national-security/iran-rapidly-building-cyber-warfare-capabilities/. 
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high-tech companies and mass media.”40 This type of attack is known by cyber experts as 
an advanced persistent threat (APT), “a network attack in which an unauthorized person 
gains access to a network and stays there undetected for a long period of time. The 
intention of an APT attack is to steal data rather than to cause damage to the network.”41 
To gain access to the Japanese and South Korean networks, according to 
Kaspersky, the attackers masked a backdoor entry known as Fucobha:  
The “Icefog” backdoor set (also known as “Fucobha”) is an interactive 
espionage tool that is directly controlled by the attackers. There are 
versions for both Microsoft Windows and Mac OS X. In its latest 
incarnation, Icefog doesn’t automatically [infiltrate] data[;] instead, it is 
operated by the attackers to perform actions directly on the victim’s live 
systems. During Icefog attacks, several other malicious tools and 
backdoors were uploaded to the victims’ machines, for data exfiltration 
and lateral movement.42 
Once inside the system, the hackers stayed undetected while extracting whatever 
data the group was after.43 Effective backdoor entry to servers guaranteed a high success 
rate for Icefog. Kaspersky traced the origin of Icefog back to exploitations in Java 
programs and within the Microsoft Office and Mac OS X operating systems.44 At the 
time of the study, Kaspersky Labs exposed six different backdoor variants of Icefog:  
The “old” 2011 Icefog—which sends stolen data by e-mail; this version 
was used against the Japanese House of Representatives and the House of 
Councilors in 2011. 
Type “1” “normal” Icefog—which interacts with command-and-control 
servers. 
                                                 
40 “The ‘Icefog’ Apt: A Tale of Cloak and Three Daggers.” Kaspersky Lab, 2013, 
http://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/icefog.pdf. 
41 Tech Target, s.v. “Advanced persistent threat (APT),” accessed April 2, 2016, 
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/advanced-persistent-threat-APT.  
42 “The ‘Icefog’ Apt,” Kaspersky. 
43“Maritime Cyber-Risks,” CyberKeel, 7.  
44 Kaspersky Lab, “Kaspersky Lab exposes ‘Icefog’: a new cyber-espionage campaign focusing on 




Type “2” Icefog—which interacts with a script-based proxy server that 
redirects commands from the attackers to another machine. 
Type “3” Icefog—We (Kaspersky) don’t have a sample of this variant but 
we observed a certain kind of C&C (command and control) that uses a 
different communication method; we suspect there are victims infected 
with this malware. 
Type “4” Icefog—same situation as “type 3.” 
Icefog-NG—which communicates by direct TCP (Transmission Control 
Protocol) connection to port 5600.45 
Once Kaspersky Labs composed and publically released its report on Icefog, the 
threat and hackers soon disappeared from the Internet. The findings enabled IT security 
companies around the world to verify system networks to see whether Icefog had also 
affected their grids. With the availability of IP addresses for Icefog, one unnamed U.S. oil 
and gas company concluded its systems had been compromised without knowing the 
exact information taken or how long its systems had been penetrated.46  
3. Ghost Shipping  
Drug traffickers are cashing in on the vulnerabilities surrounding shipping 
network systems. Between 2011 and 2013, Dutch drug traffickers employed computer 
savvy counterparts to hide cocaine inside containers enroute to the Port of Antwerp by 
infiltrating networks responsible for managing what was inside each TEU.47 According 
to CyberKeel, the hackers were able “to have remote access to the terminal systems, and 
thereby they [drug traffickers] were able to release containers to their own truckers 
without knowledge of the port or the shipping line.”48 Employees noticed that containers 
were continually disappearing from the port and reported the attacks to local authorities. 
                                                 
45 “The ‘Icefog’ Apt,” Kaspersky.  
46 Mike Lennon, “‘Icefog’ Cyber Attacks Targeted U.S. Energy Firms Using Java Backdoor,” 
Security Week, January 14, 2014, http://www.securityweek.com/icefog-cyber-attacks-targeted-us-energy-
firms-using-java-backdoor.  
47 Tom Bateman, “Police Warning after Drug Traffickers’ Cyber-attack,” BBC News, October 16, 
2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24539417. 
48 “Maritime Cyber-Risks,” CyberKeel, 8.  
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According to Dutch prosecutors, smugglers had placed drugs in containers of commercial 
goods departing from South America to Antwerp in hopes of going unnoticed. When the 
shipments arrived, traffickers arrived in trucks and produced false bills of lading to take 
custody of the containers with commercial goods and drugs. By the time the rightful 
owners of the TEUs arrived with proper bills of lading, the traffickers had already taken 
delivery of the shipments. The stevedores believed they had turned the TEUs to the 
rightful owners because the networks reflected this information. Eventually, security 
officers informed higher authorities, and police raided the suspects' hideout, finding 
hacking devices, drugs, 1.3 million Euros, and firearms.49  
Danny Decraene, the head of Antwerp's organized crime unit states, “These 
criminal organizations always look for a new way to get drugs out of the harbor. In this 
case, they hired hackers [who were] very high level, intelligent guys, doing a lot of 
software work.”50 Director of Europol Rob Wainwright believes this is a “new business 
model” for drug traffickers who are looking to expose the cyber community, especially in 
the maritime sector. Wainwright believes in order to stay ahead in the cyber domain, 
local authorities must learn to become more tech-savvy and governments must provide 
thorough legislation to support the police authorities.51 To this day, the amount of drugs 
smuggled in and out of the port is still unknown. 
Penetrating networks in this fashion has been coined “ghost shipping,” and the 
Antwerp case was the first known breach of its kind.52 Australian customs discovered a 
similar attack in 2012. Criminals hacked logistic software to determine whether 
Australian customs tracked its containers. If cargoes went unnoticed by custom officials, 
the group would intercept the shipments. If the group sensed its containers were at risk, it 
simply abandoned the cargo at the pier to avoid being caught.53 
                                                 
49 Bateman, “Police Warning.”  
50 Ibid. 
51 Bateman, “Police Warning.” 
52 “Maritime Cyber-Risks,” CyberKeel, 8. 
53 Ibid. 
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4. Mobile Offshore Drilling Units  
Mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs) enable gas and oil companies to drill for 
untapped resources offshore. In 2013, while drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, workers from 
a U.S.-based oil company accidently uploaded malware onto the main computing system 
of the MODU. The effects of this attack paralyzed the rig, particularly from 
communicating with the rig’s navigation system. A worker had unintentionally 
introduced malware through a thumb drive, which held previously corrupted 
pornographic images and illegal music.54 According to the after action report, the 
corrupted files that had been downloaded from the Internet “crossed over to the rig’s 
computer systems when the devices were plugged in.”55 Thrusters and navigational 
equipment aboard the MODU were immobilized, causing the MODU to drift away from 
the drilling site, consequentially cutting into production time.56 
Two similar cases involving offshore drilling equipment have been made public. 
The first breach caused an oil rig to unbalance itself, resulting in the loss of seven days of 
production. The second case involved the transportation of a rig from South Korea to 
Brazil, during which malware penetrated the propulsion system and delayed delivery by 
19 days.57 Although these attacks caused monetary losses, researchers believe future 
breaches on MODUs will cause environmental damage through oil spills and loss of life 
through explosions.58  
5. Summary 
The maritime community is quite reactive instead of proactive toward cyber 
threats. Criminals with the ability to pass illicit drugs through a port simply by accessing 
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logistical software and creating false bills of lading, such as in the ghost shipping case, 
should pique concern for responsible parties in U.S. national security. Some penetrations 
are inadvertent, as the MODU example illustrated. Government officials and the 
maritime industry must learn from the recent cyber-attacks to keep U.S. ports and 
interests open.  
B. EQUIPMENT VULNERABILITIES IN SHIP SYSTEMS  
Today’s mariners rely heavily on networks, systems, and outside sources for 
navigation. Many significant cyber threats are the result of vulnerabilities in equipment 
carried and used by the maritime industry worldwide. Equipment vulnerable to cyber-
attacks includes navigation systems, and this section reviews four of those critical 
systems: the automatic identification system (AIS), global positioning system (GPS), 
industrial control system (ICS), and Electronic Chart Display Information System 
(ECDIS).  
1. Ships Disappearing from the Automatic Identification System  
AIS is a shipboard safety feature placed on all commercial or military ships over 
1,600 gross tons that allows mariners to obtain valuable information about other 
vessels.59 AIS is a non-encrypted transponder responsible for transmitting course, speed, 
type of vessel, type of cargo, at-anchor or underway status, and other information for 
safety at sea. The complexity and resources employed for AIS is referenced in Figure 1.60 
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Figure 1.  AIS Overview from Coast Guard Proceedings61 
Vulnerabilities in the AIS system are widely known. For example, a study 
conducted by the Trend Micro Forward-looking Threat Team, a threat defense group that 
focuses on the technology sector, was able to recreate a VHF frequency on AIS that 
simulated a “ghost ship” in a harbor and alerted nearby vessels they were on a collision 
course with another vessel.62 Furthermore, Trend Micro exposed a full list of AIS 
“spoofing” abilities including false course, speed, ship flag and name; false weather alerts 
causing digresses from original plan of intended movement; falsification as a maritime 
law enforcement authority (USCG); false maritime rescue platforms, false man overboard 
situations; and overwhelming of AIS leading to double reporting and false data causing 
system overloads.63  
In 2012, Reuters exposed the illegal transportation of Iranian crude oil from Iran 
to China, India, and South Korea. Research exposed there were at least three Iranian 
ships flying a Tanzanian flag while pretending to be Syrian-owned in an attempt to avoid 
                                                 
61 Source: Middleton, “Hide and Seek,” 49. 
62Ferran, “The Guys Who Can Make Oil Tankers Disappear.” 
63“Maritime Cyber-Risks,” CyberKeel, 9. 
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a boarding and inspection of the containers.64 Getting around international sanctions was 
easy for the Iranian oil company, which falsified its AIS data to reflect that of a 
Tanzanian ship. When questioned, officials representing the flagging agency in Tanzania 
denied these Iranian vessels as part of their registry.65 The amount of illegal oil or other 
goods transported by these ships is unknown and exposes another weakness in 
technology on which the maritime industry relies.   
A similar event took place in 2010 when a private fishing ship, illegally engaged 
in fishing activity in Argentinian waters, evaded the Argentinian Coast Guard by 
traveling outside the country's maritime borders and disabling AIS aboard the vessel. 
Although the Argentinian Coast Guard assumed the vessel had traveled outside its 
territorial waters, the coast guard was unable to track the vessel.66 These cases suggest 
that as long as AIS is non-encrypted, problems will continue to remain, and legitimacy of 
data passed through the system will remain questionable.67 
2. GPS Terrorism 
In the early days of sailing, mariners were not worried about the sun, moon, or 
stars falling from the sky and, thus, losing the ability to navigate. Today, with the 
maritime world’s heavy reliance on technology, GPS data is crucial to maintain safety of 
navigation at sea for all vessels.68 Spoofing and jamming are two different techniques 
that wreak havoc on the maritime community whenever successfully employed. GPS 
spoofing is defined as “an electronic attack involving signals being sent to a receiver to 
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control navigation” whereas GPS jamming involves an actor intentionally blocking GPS 
signals.69  
The Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA), a subgroup of DHS, has 
identified concerns for GPS jamming and spoofing for commercial shipping, primarily 
over mariners' overreliance on GPS systems and abandonment of traditional visual aids in 
navigating narrow channels. Operating near shoal water or in a narrow channel naturally 
increases the risk of navigational disasters such as grounding or collision. A loss of a 
ship’s navigational inputs, steering, or propulsion would be catastrophic and cause 
significant damage, delays in services, and financial strains.70 Another GPS incident took 
place in 2013 when four cranes were taken out of commission at a port in the United 
States for seven hours due to a GPS anomaly. Although this was not an attack, the 
anomaly reinforced the view that ships over-rely on GPS for maintaining port operations 
and the flow of goods and services.71 
3. Industrial Control Systems 
An industrial control system (ICS) is made up of multiple control systems aboard 
ships that feed into a central network. Smaller nodes aboard the vessel allow mariners to 
access different data regarding the ship’s propulsion, navigation, and steering, to name a 
few. The diagram below is an example of the complexity of the systems72: 
In July 2013, a group from the University of Texas accessed the ICS of a 210-foot 
yacht while the vessel was underway in the Mediterranean. With prior permission from 
the captain, the group had taken full control of the ship’s navigation system and drove the 
yacht any way the group wanted.73 The penetration exposed serious vulnerabilities to the 
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yacht’s automatic navigation system and rudder control.74 Captain Andrew Scholfield, 
Captain of the vessel, stated that his “team did a number of attacks and basically we on 
the bridge were absolutely unaware of any difference.”75 The ability for the team at the 
University of Texas to control a vessel over 6,000 miles away provides evidence that 
maritime systems as platforms are vulnerable no matter where they are in the world. 
Although the test was planned and controlled, it still surprised the captain that the 
transition to the red team was unnoticeable; the test raises questions about whom else 
might have the ability to penetrate a ship using this technique. 
4. Electronic Chart Display and Information System Hacks  
Paper charts are becoming a relic of the past. The Electronic Chart Display and 
Information System (ECDIS), a computer-based navigational chart display, has replaced 
paper charts. The many sensors around a typical commercial ship feed the following 
input into ECDIS: AIS, GPS data, speed, course, and radar.76 As the primary means of 
navigation, the ECDIS system provides electronic digital charts that allow a mate of the 
watch on a civilian ship, or an officer of the deck (OOD) on a USN vessel to properly 
navigate. Receiving the most up-to-date chart information requires ECDIS systems to 
establish a connection through non-secure Internet networks aboard vessels, which could 
put the integrity of a ship's navigational data at risk.77 In January of 2014, NCC Groups, 
an information assurance firm, played the role of a hacker trying to gain access to a ship’s 
ICS. According to CyberKeel, after undergoing tests, “several security weaknesses were 
found including the ability to read, download, replace or delete any file stored on the 
machine hosting ECDIS.”78 
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Overreliance on ECDIS data can be costly. On January 17, 2013, a U.S. Navy 
minesweeper, the USS Guardian (MCM 5), ran aground on the Tubbatatha Reef off the 
coast of the Philippines. Despite numerous alarms and warnings from the Navy’s version 
of ECDIS (ECDIS-N), the navigation and bridge team disregarded visual cues and fixes 
as required under navy direction. Upon an investigation, the navy determined the 
minesweeper loaded the wrong charts prior to sea detail, thus landing the vessel aground. 
This event, although not a cyber-attack, depicts the navy ship's overreliance on electronic 
data.79 
5. Summary  
Technology is a mariner’s best friend or worst enemy. Overreliance on these 
systems can create a false sense of security, especially while navigating or operating 
equipment on the high seas. The industry will be adversely affected in the near future 
with a growing cyber threat.  
C. UNDERSTANDING THE PLAYERS 
Different players and groups may have reasons to hack into terminal software to 
gain access to data, terminals, or a ship itself. The end goal for an individual or group will 
be different depending on what the overall goal is at the end of a mission. The Industrial 
Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) places cyber crooks 
into one of five categories: national governments, terrorists, industrial spies and 
organized crime groups, hacktivists, and hackers.80 Any of these individuals or groups 
could cause more harm than another based on available resources and the type of cyber-
attack planned.  
National governments are the biggest threat to cyber-attacks due to the vast 
amount of resources and funding one government may have to employ against another 
According to the ICS-CERT, the goal of a government-sponsored cyber-attack on another 
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nation is “to weaken, disrupt, or destroy.”81 Although most nation states have the funding 
and resources to support whatever attack they deem necessary, ISC-CERT believes that 
will change within the next five to ten years.82 Traditional terrorists do not play as great a 
role in the cyber realm because, according to Marshall Newberry of ICS-CERT, they "are 
less developed in their cyber capabilities than are other adversaries.”83 Industrial spies 
and organized crime groups are out for profit and looking to put money in their or their 
company’s pockets. These spies or groups may work within the maritime industry itself, 
trying to get the upper hand on competitors. Hacktivists consist of groups who have a 
small political agenda. For example, Greenpeace could have hacktivists infiltrate an 
offshore oil platform to protest against oil drilling. Hackers make up the majority of 
cybercriminals today due to sheer size. What makes hackers unique is their ability to 
work almost anywhere and attack anything. Newberry states, “Most hackers do not have 
the level of skill required to threaten U.S. critical networks. … [W]ith the growing 
number of skilled and malicious hackers, the likelihood of successful attack continually 
increases.”84  
The insider threat will be the worst one yet. According to Carnegie Mellon in 
2012, an insider threat is “a current or former employee, contractor, or business partner 
who: has or had authorized access to an organization’s network, system, or data; can 
bypass existing physical and electronic security measure through legitimate measures.”85 
Insider threats are especially dangerous because they can happen for a number of 
different reasons. Greg Smith, an Intelligence Specialist Chief for U.S.C.G Cyber 
Command, states that reasons for insider threats can range from problems at work to 
divided loyalty, blackmail, compulsive behaviors, or issues with one’s family.86  
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The insider threat may be the most difficult to recognize or combat at a shipyard 
and terminal. Employers are hoping that their companies hire the right people for the job. 
However, there is a risk associated with hiring personnel—despite clear background 
checks—that makes any company, especially the maritime cyber domain, vulnerable. 
Chief Technology Officer of Imperva states, “For most organizations, insider threats have 
moved beyond risk into reality; however, many threat vectors can be protected against 
with a measured approach to business security.”87 Weaknesses in the maritime cyber 
domain and to our national security can be someone who knows a terminal very well and 
wants to cause direct or indirect harm to the country.  
D. SERIOUSNESS OF A MARITIME CYBER-ATTACK 
Recent events in the Maritime industry enable forecasters to predict the outcomes 
of maritime cyber-attacks in the United States. Port closures, union strikes, and delayed 
movements of ships can suggest how severe an attack could be on the nation. In this 
section, the aforementioned recent attacks and equipment vulnerabilities help create a 
scenario based on evidence. 
1. Economic  
The first major shutdown of a U.S. port since 1971 took place in September 2002 
when the Pacific Maritime Association and the International Longshoreman and 
Warehouseman Union could not reach an agreement over pay. The closure of 29 ports on 
the West Coast lasted for 11 days with loss of revenues reaching $15.6 billion.88 These 
port closures adversely affected rail and truck workers who move the cargo from a West-
Coast port to the cargo’s final destination. The port of Tacoma, which maintains supply 
routes for communities in Alaska, was unable to fulfill requisitions for supplies, which 
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cut off critical imports to the Last Frontier.89 The loss of revenue and support of ships on 
the West Coast caused significant economic delays both directly for the country and 
indirectly for shipping companies who had contracts to meet and deliveries to make. 
Again, in February 2015, the West Coast of the United States suffered 29 port 
closures because of a union strike, which essentially stopped the supply chain and routes 
of any cargo trying to enter or exit the United States. This port shut down took place not 
because of a cyber-attack but because 20,000 stevedores were working without a contract 
for more than six months.90 Normal operations resumed after the union and the Pacific 
Maritime Association reached an agreement. Today, experts believe a similar shutdown 
of West-Coast port operations could lead to losses of $1–$2 billion daily.91 These 
examples demonstrate how easily and quickly a stoppage at a major U.S. port can impact 
the nation’s economy.  
Hurricane Sandy hit the East Coast of the United States in 2012, devastating 
portions of New York and New Jersey. The impact of Hurricane Sandy caused $70 
billion in damages to both commercial and privately owned businesses and homes.92 The 
hurricane destroyed numerous terminal sensors including security cameras and control 
systems, power and telephone lines, and port infrastructure. Problems were widespread 
along the Eastern Seaboard of the United States as well as in the Caribbean as a majority 
of critical cargoes were either lost or unable to reach their final destinations.93 Despite the 
devastation caused by Hurricane Sandy, terminal operations were able to resume safely 
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when the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey began falling back on older 
technology. According to Mark Szakonyi, executive editor at Joc.com, mariners were 
able to restore somewhat normal operations using VHF radios, battle lanterns aboard tugs 
and storage facilities, as well as backup generators.94 Substituting a cyber-attack for a 
disaster like Hurricane Sandy yields nearly the same impact, without the kinetic damage 
associated with a natural disaster. A cyber-attack will cause delays in operational 
commitments by ports. Cargoes will be lost in a cyber-world, and figuring out where 
everything is will be a logistical nightmare. The industry in New York and New Jersey 
were able to ease the burden of Hurricane Sandy with paper charts and VHF radios. New 
York and New Jersey have the capabilities in place to be more resilient against kinetic 
attacks, especially after 9/11. Backup charts and VHF radios will not be enough when a 
cyber-storm appears out of nowhere. 
2. Liquefied Natural Gas  
There are more associated risks than financial aspects of a maritime cyber-attack. 
Republican Representative Candice Miller from Michigan argues that liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) aboard ships and at terminal storage facilities will cause massive damage to 
surrounding communities and the environment if hacked.95 The only accident in the 
United States from LNG happened in WWII when cells holding LNG ruptured, and one 
million gallons ended up in sewer pipes, killing 128 people and injuring 200 in Cleveland 
Ohio.96 The likelihood of an event of this type resulting from a cyber-attack may seem 
remote, but the results of such an attack would cause economic, trade, and public safety 
concerns. Miller concluded her report to Congress, stating, “Just as we have hardened 
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physical security, we need to do the same in the virtual space for systems critical to the 
marine transportation system to protect against malicious actors.”97  
E. SUMMARY  
Attacks on the maritime community are all significant in helping determine 
whether more measures, programs, and government agencies need to be involved in 
protecting the maritime community against an attack. A serious attack on the United 
States could be devastating economically, not to mention deadly. In the end, the evidence 
provided in this chapter strongly suggests that maritime networks and equipment are 
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III. NATIONAL SECURITY AND MARITIME CYBER WARFARE 
We are vulnerable in the military and in our governments, but I think 
we're most vulnerable to cyber attacks commercially. This challenge is 
going to significantly increase. It's not going to go away.    
—Admiral Michael Mullen, USN98 
 
Maritime cyber-attacks have happened in the past, are happening now, and will 
continue in the future. The more today’s mariners, ship brokers, husbandry agencies, and 
others surrounding the community rely on Internet-based programs to assist and ease 
tasking, the more the community will be vulnerable to attacks. To evaluate the readiness 
of U.S. ports to cyber threats, Commander Joseph Kramek, a USCG Federal Executive 
Fellow for Brookings, conducted a series of port vulnerability assessments in top U.S. 
ports. This assessment provided data for Kramek’s understanding of how well prepared 
the United States is for an attack. In his preface, Kramek states, “The level of 
cybersecurity awareness and culture in U.S. port facilities is relatively low…and not a 
single one [port] had developed a cyber incident response plan.”99  
A maritime cyber-attack at a major port in the United States would disrupt the 
numerous operations of the port, cause financial burdens, and make U.S. infrastructure 
vulnerable. To determine whether a maritime cyber-attack from a non–U.S.–flagged 
vessel entering the United States poses a threat to U.S. national security, this chapter 
evaluates evidence from Kramek’s assessments of the Port of Baltimore, Port of Houston 
Authority, Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles, Port of Vicksburg, and the Port of 
Beaumont. Second, this chapter analyzes the cybersecurity culture in these ports. Finally, 
this chapter summarizes the report, stressing the importance for maritime cyber 
dominance.  
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A. FUNDING AND PORT ANALYSIS  
Funding is always required for the implementation of security measures. 
Government agencies provide part of the funding for the maritime community to promote 
security and safety at U.S. ports. Port management often uses the money based on threat 
evaluations as top officials deem necessary. This section evaluates port funding and the 
overall cybersecurity resilience of top ports in the United States.  
1. U.S. Port Funding  
The attacks of September 11 reminded the United States that oceans no longer 
protect the U.S. from deliberate attacks. In 2002, the Maritime Transportation and 
Security Act (MTSA) was signed into law by Congress to directly support port and 
waterway security.100 Under § 70107, Grants, of the MTSA, the following funding is 
outlined:  
Salary, benefits, overtime compensation, retirement contributions, and 
other costs of additional Coast Guard mandated security personnel. 
The cost of acquisition, operation, and maintenance of security equipment 
or facilities to be used for security monitoring and recording, security 
gates and fencing, marine barriers for designated security zones, security-
related lighting systems, remote surveillance, concealed video systems, 
security vessels, and other security-related infrastructure or equipment that 
contributes to the overall security of passengers, cargo, or crewmembers. 
The cost of screening equipment, including equipment that detects 
weapons of mass-destruction and conventional explosives and of testing 
and evaluating such equipment, to certify secure systems of transportation. 
The cost of conducting vulnerability assessments to evaluate and make 
recommendations with respect to security.101 
 
                                                 




The effort to meet requirements set by MTSA 2002 is supplemented through the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which issues grants from the Port 
Security Grant Program (PSGP).102 FEMA developed a risk-analysis model to categorize 
port areas in the United States as one of three categories—Group one, Group two, or 
Group three—in order to issue appropriate funds. Group one contains the highest risk 
ports and includes, Los Angles, Long Beach, and Houston. Group two includes 
Baltimore, Beaumont, and Vicksburg. Kramek’s report did not evaluate ports in group 
three.103 Since Kramek’s study focuses on fiscal year (FY) 2012 funding of PSGP 
monies, this chapter uses the total funding of FY2012, $97.5 million.104 MTSA 2002 
does not list cybersecurity as a threat.  
2. Maryland Port Administration and the Port of Baltimore  
The Port of Baltimore (POB) is a crucial hub for goods and services crossing the 
Atlantic Ocean to the United States. According to World Port Source, in 2015 the POB 
received more than 13.3 billion kilograms of imports from more than 125 countries, and 
the Maryland Port Administration (MPA) managed 46,827 TEUs. The volume of 
business the port sees is critical to the surrounding population for direct economic 
reasons, trade, and employment. The POB has direct access to rail systems and highways, 
which make it easy to deliver goods throughout the country.  
The POB piers are owned by the MPA; however, Ports America Chesapeake 
(PAC), which rents the space from MPA, takes full charge of the offloading process. The 
process begins with computer and terminal management systems that manage automatic 
crane operations prioritizing TEUs for transportation. While the automatic offloading 
process continues, stevedores and PAC officials manage the operations from wireless 
network devices, ensuring accuracy during the offloading process. Many of the devices 
used to verify TEU placement are third-party handheld scanners. While PAC rents the 
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space from the MPA, MPA has zero insight or validation authority over cybersecurity in 
any of the network terminals, scanners, or computers used by PAC. Although the process 
is efficient in turnaround time, the logistic management system and networks in place are 
vulnerable to cyber-attack.  
MPA does control who accesses the facility from roadways but not through a 
physical security guard at a gate. In order to maintain efficient vehicle movement in and 
out of the port area, MPA has employed a software program known as eModal, described 
on their website as follows: 
[The] world's largest port community system … used extensively 
throughout North America. As a cloud based solution, eModal offers 
intermodal supply chain stakeholders complete visibility via a central 
portal. eModal enables users to manage truck registries, appointments, 
dispatching, chassis rental billing and fee payments.105 
Once registered on MPA’s website for eModal, truckers are given a radio 
frequency identification tag (RFID), which identifies the truck and driver. While the 
trucks move through entry points and toward terminals, MPA watches the activities of the 
port from video monitors with more than 400 security cameras throughout the POB. 
eModal’s network is managed by the MPA’s in-house information-technology (IT) 
support team. Although the IT members can record and save all data from eModal and 
security cameras onto a shared network with the Maryland Department of Transportation 
(MDOT), they cannot access or monitor data from PAC.106  
The MPA has reported numerous outside attempts to gain access to eModal and 
the security cameras over the installation. It attributes these threats to crewmembers of 
ships entering the port who try to access the Wi-Fi connection. The ability to narrow 
down the source of cyber-attacks is difficult because the MPA is unable to access all 
electronic systems and networks managed either by PAC or from commercial shipping. 
Security officers at the MPA have installed firewalls and malware protection to detect, 
deter, and prevent such attacks from seriously shutting down the port. Kramek states, “A 
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disruption to any of MPA’s or its terminal lessees’ networked system would quickly 
disrupt cargo operation and slowly ripple out to impact the one-third of the U.S. 
population that resides within an overnight drive of POB.”107 Furthermore, the lack of 
concern from upper-management over maritime cyber-security has left the MPA with 
insufficient knowledge and training for cyber-threats.108 MPA did not have a 
cybersecurity mitigation plan or a pre-planned response if a cyber-attack were to take 
place at the POB despite the amount of services the port handles. The report mentions 
that the POB has focused its security efforts on physical security by adding cameras and 
an access-control center for visitors; nevertheless, the POB has never requested funding 
for cyber-related protection.109  
In response to acquisitions in the report, POB spokesman Richard Scher claims 
the report was “misleading and factually incorrect” and that the POB has worked very 
closely with FBI’s cyber security team at Fort Meade, Maryland.110 Because Kramek’s 
study was not sanctioned by a governing authority, Scher would not reveal details about 
the POB's cyber-security protocols but insisted they were up to date.111  
In its Strategic Plan 2015, the MPA states, 
The MPA has incorporated policies, procedures and technology which 
exceed the Act’s requirements. The MPA continuously assesses the 
potential threats and vulnerabilities of its terminals in order to maintain the 
highest level of security possible.112 
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Despite these claims, the word “cyber” appears only once in the 36-page document, 
suggesting that the MPA still does not take a maritime cyber threat seriously.113 No other 
information regarding cyber measures taken by PAC could be found on its website.  
3. Port of Houston  
The Port of Houston (POH) is the largest port in the United States and the tenth 
largest in the world, located inland off the Gulf of Mexico. In 2013, the POH received 
77.6 million tons of cargo with a net worth of $74.3 billion. The port’s biggest importers 
by tonnage include Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Columbia.114 Port capacity 
comprises 44 general cargo wharves, 19 container wharves, five liquid bulk wharves, and 
three dry bulk wharves with more than 150 auxiliary port facilities.115 The port 
operations are controlled by the Port of Houston Authority (PHA), which owns eight 
terminals and leases the terminals as needed. 
The PHA relies on a terminal operating system known as NAVIS. NAVIS 
controls crane operations, security, cargo movements, billing, automotive gates, fuel 
farms, and HVAC systems at the facility.116 NAVIS appeals to more than 280 terminal 
centers worldwide due to its simplicity for port operations.117 
The physical security of the POH is high, with three different agencies 
responsible: the Houston Ship Channel Security District (HSCSD), the Houston Police, 
and the USCG. All are equally invested in the safety of navigation and maritime presence 
in and out of the port. The PHA has an in-house IT team that monitors the networks 
controlling port operations. The PHA has a software system and firewalls in place to 
monitor the port's cyber realm. To analyze the effectiveness of the software and firewalls 
in place, the PHA hired third-party contractors to conduct a series of “penetration testing” 
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attacks on the network.118 Despite the red-team's analysis that demonstrated IT was able 
to fix potential threats before they became catastrophic, Kramek found multiple 
weaknesses in the PHA: “New employees do not receive cybersecurity training before 
being granted network access, and private stevedore company employees hired by PHA 
to conduct cargo operations use their own laptops to connect to PHA’s cargo 
management system.”119 Furthermore, PHA “did not cite cybersecurity as one of its top 
three challenges or threats,” despite worries from the PHA's IT staff over the use of 
personal thumb drives. The ability for stevedores to access the cargo management system 
on personal computers threatens PHA’s networks.  
The PHA's Strategic Plan for 2015, prepared by global management consulting 
firm Leigh Fisher, did not list “cyber” anywhere in the port’s plan. Threats therein 
include “events—natural disasters, security incidents, [and] accidents.”120Although the 
term “security incidents” could possibly include cyber threats, the report does not 
specifically spell out cyber concerns, thus pointing to the lack of seriousness in the way 
port leadership approaches the maritime domain. In his conclusion, Kramek states, “If the 
NAVIS system were to go down, PHA’s terminal operations would cease. A cyberattack 
…would be catastrophic … impacting 70 percent of all containerized cargo … as well as 
a large portion of the American energy supply.”121  
4. The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach  
The two largest ports on the West Coast of the United States are the Ports of Los 
Angeles (PLA) and Long Beach (PLB). Both ports accept goods daily from major 
exporting countries like China, Vietnam, and Malaysia. In 2015, PLA's and PLB’s TEU 
counts were 8.2 and 8.7 million, respectively, making up more than 15 million TEUs in 
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2015 alone for the terminals to manage.122 The service capabilities for both of these ports 
include containerized, dry bulk, liquid bulk, break bulk, and roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) 
capabilities. Due to the shallow drafts of California ports, many supertankers, including 
very large crude carriers (VLCCs) must make berth in either PLA or PLB to offload 
cargo.  
PLB relies on major computer-based networks to ensure smooth and efficient 
terminal operations. These networks include control systems, which manage the 
offloading of crude oil, crane operations employed by stevedores, logistics management 
software, and container management software.123 Due to the vast amount of cargo 
operations surrounding the port, PLB understands that a major network is required to 
monitor every aspect of operations within the limits of the PLB. In 2009, the PLB as well 
as more than 25 federal, state, and local agencies working together to support port 
security formed a joint command and control center (JCCC) to establish a common 
operating picture. PLB maintains a highly trained in-house IT department, which works 
on network issues and, when necessary, outsources contractors to support the IT 
department.124  
In order to maintain its effectiveness, the port developed the Virtual Port System 
(VPS), which came online in the summer of 2014.125 VPS has the ability, according to 
the Port of Long Beach, to “integrate information from more than 50 data sources into 
comprehensive real-time images the agencies can access simultaneously to coordinate 
and deploy response teams, tackle the problem and restore port operations faster and 
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more efficiently than ever before.”126 VPS creates a common operating picture for the 
PLB and all 26 of the entities involved.  
PLB is aware that the port and its network infrastructure are at risk, and as a 
precautionary measure, the port did not allow outside users to access the Internet or Wi-
Fi at the port. As of 2013, PLB had invested over $1 million in network infrastructure 
including firewalls and security applications that monitor all users on the network. 
Kramek assesses the PLB as follows: “The second busiest port in the nation does not 
currently have a dedicated written cybersecurity directive or response plan, nor is 
cybersecurity response part of any existing risk management plans.”127 Upon completion 
of the initial assessment, the PLB reported that it had completed a vulnerability 
assessment on VTS prior to installation. No other concerns were listed.128 
The research and proactive approach by the PLB did not end after the assessment 
from Kramek. On October 8, 2015, Randy Parsons, Director of Security Service at the 
Port of Long Beach, presented written testimony to the House Committee on Homeland 
Security's Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, voicing his concerns to 
members of Congress. In his written statement, Parsons noted that maritime cyber-attacks 
could affect the PLB as well as have secondary and tertiary effects on subcontractors 
including “shippers, vessels, terminal operating systems, equipment, storage facilities, 
rail and truck.”129 Proving the vulnerability of the nation’s ports against cyber-attacks, 
Parsons admits that the PLB receives “one million hacking attempts a day.”130 In his 
testimony to Congress, Parsons outlined recommendations and actions he believed would 
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create a more resilient maritime community. These recommendations are evaluated in 
Chapter V.  
The PLB is adjacent to the PLA, the largest port in the western United States. 
During the port review in 2013, the PLA believed it was susceptible to maritime cyber-
attacks because of the port's reliance on logistic management systems and the amount of 
lessees the PLB accepts.131 PLA focuses a majority of funding toward physical security 
because of the number of small and recreational craft in the area, which continues to be a 
concern for security managers at the port.  
The PLA established a geographic information center that enables real-time alerts 
for which all parties concerned at the PLA can monitor activities of the port. The PLA 
has an in-house IT department that monitors networks and servers as well as ensures the 
networks are “routinely backed up.”132 The IT department is responsible for not only the 
networks and domains but also the training of all new employees who work for the PLA 
on cyber issues and awareness. The IT department runs software and network scans that 
look for potential hacking attempts on the network. Unfortunately, at the time of the 
study, the PLA “ha[d] not conducted a cybersecurity vulnerability assessment nor … 
ha[d] a cyber incident response plan,” though it had received $1.65 million for bulking up 
cybersecurity awareness and defense.133 Kramek’s report concluded that the security 
manager of the PLA during a cyber-attack would only be informed of the impacts to the 
port, leaving the in-house IT team to fix the mess.134 
On October 16, 2013, the PLA requested funding for the first phase of a cyber 
security operations center (CSCO).135 The CSCO concept had been floating around 
security managers since early 2009, and with the rise of cybercrimes, it was crucial the 
PLA moved ahead with the program. The total cost for the CSCO project was 
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$2,564,000, of which $1.6 million came from PSGP's 2012 funds and the remainder from 
PLA dividends. The reported net cost for operating the CSCO is $50,000 per year.136  
Detailed reports highlight the capabilities of the CSCO, including “advanced 
hardware and software that is used to proactively monitor the computer environment to 
prevent a breach and be able to quickly detect and respond if a breach does occur.”137 
According to the CSCO, over the past few years, the program “has reduced the cyber 
risks for the Port of LA by complementing its exciting cyber efforts with improved cyber 
defense and response, and data analysis and sharing.”138 In November 2014, the PLA 
won the American Association of Port Authorities' (AAPA's) 2014 Information 
Technology Award for the development and utilization of the CSCO.139 PLA appears to 
be on the right path toward maritime cyber resilience.  
5. Port of Vicksburg 
As the Mississippi River flows into the Gulf of Mexico, the Port of Vicksburg 
(POV) is decisive for open sea-lanes into the heart of the United States. The Warren 
County Port Commission, in charge of port operations at the POV states, “The Vicksburg 
Port services industries that range from steel and lumber, to coal and petroleum … with a 
customer base spanning from small-businesses to Fortune 500 Companies.”140 Providing 
cost effective transportation inland, the POV sees 900,000 tons of goods a year, which 
eventually end up on trucks, rail, or smaller shipping vessels headed up the Mississippi. 
The POV is a crude-oil hub for the Gulf of Mexico and refineries located at Ergon’s St 
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James terminal. Ergon Refining, Incorporated (ERI) and Magnolia Marine Transport 
(MMT) share joint logistic management software, which manages cargo offloading, 
secondary transportation, storage capacity, and terminal operations.141 
The software used to process logistic data on computers at ERI and aboard tugs is 
susceptible to hacking. In an effort to cut overhead costs, ERI purchased a license for 
data acquisition program Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA). SCADA 
manages many of the terminal's operations including the valves, pipelines, and remotely 
controlled services within the port.142 SCADA made headlines when it admitted that 
cyber-attacks against its server increased from 163,228 in 2012 to 675,186 as of January 
2014. The attacks targeted critical infrastructure, power plants, factories, and refineries in 
Finland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.143 Homeland Security Today’s 
Senior Editor Amanda Vicinanzo reviewed the cyber-attacks associated with SCADA, 
stating, "SCADA attacks often go unreported, since companies are only required to report 
security breaches involving personal or payment information. Consequently, individual 
companies may be unaware a SCADA threat exists until they are targeted themselves."144  
The port's IT security operations tended to be weaker at the time of the report 
compared to the POB, PLA, and PLB. Kramek concluded that ERI was somewhat aware 
of cyber threats in the maritime community. MMT was “not as aware of cybersecurity 
challenges, mainly because very few networked systems exist on its vessels other than the 
laptops running cargo tracking and vessel location systems.”145 The report reveals four 
findings: only one individual was responsible for cybersecurity at ERI; regular users of 
SCADA never received cyber awareness training; cybersecurity vulnerability 
assessments were never completed; and preplanned responses had not been established to 
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respond to a cyber-attack.146 Kramek’s study mentions that ERI had been working 
toward developing a cybersecurity risk plan and strategies that incorporate cooperative 
measurements between the company and contractors. Furthermore, there was no 
searchable strategic plan for POV nor did the POV take the maritime cyber threat 
seriously as of 2013.  
6. The Port of Beaumont  
The Port of Beaumont (PBM) is located in Texas on the Gulf of Mexico, offering 
600,000 square feet of storage; access to rail, major highways, and the Gulf Intercostal 
Waterway; and provides services for military and commercial usage.147 Recognized by 
the U.S military's Transportation Command as the busiest military port in the world, “a 
cyber disruption here would impact almost 50 percent of all military cargo bound for 
overseas contingency operations and impact the U.S. military’s ability to respond to crisis 
or conflict.”148 The United States Navy Ship (USNS) Red Cloud (T-AKR-313), home-
ported out of the PBM, is one of the Military Sea Lift Command's largest preposition 
army stock ships. The purpose of the Red Cloud and the other seven ships in her class is 
to carry a majority of operational equipment and supplies to support operations overseas. 
In conjunction with the USNS Red Cloud, the U.S. Army’s 842nd Transportation 
Battalion along with civilian contractors support military loading and logistical 
operations at the POV. Like its civilian logistics agencies, the 842nd uses a complex 
network for logistical services known as a logistics management system (LMS).  
The PBM cited potential waterborne threats against USNS shipping among the 
top security concerns for the port. Port networks are stand-alone systems managed by 40 
IT civilian staff-members with one team member who is responsible for cybersecurity. 
Kramek’s study noted, “PMB has not conducted a cybersecurity vulnerability assessment 
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of its network,” and none of the IT department's members or new employees received any 
sort of information-assurance training or follow-up during in-processing.149  
In order to spot-check the 842nd, U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) 
conducted its own cybersecurity vulnerability. According to Kramek, the “842nd ha[d] 
dedicated cyber incident instructions that set forth specific actions to take in the event of a 
cyber disruption or attack” in which the military members were trained specifically to 
handle a network intrusion.150 Overall, the report highlighted how little concern the POV, 
with the exception of the 842nd, had for network security issues, despite known 
vulnerabilities. 
B. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR U.S. PORTS? 
The overall focus of the ports listed in 2013 was physical security. Sharing the 
ports with civilian pleasure craft and fears over waterside attacks concerned the port 
security managers the most. In his analysis of maritime cybersecurity, Kramek states: 
“Not only is cybersecurity awareness in U.S. port facilities generally low, but the 
cybersecurity culture in U.S. port facilities is generally lacking.”151 Among the  
ports, very few spent PSGP funds for cybersecurity projects as of FY2012, as shown in 
Table 1.152  
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Table 1.    Kramek’s Overview of PSGP Monies 153 
 
 
Kramek’s study highlights some interesting cost-analysis numbers. The PLB 
conducted a vulnerability assessment on its own with a reported cost of $30,000. Using 
the checklist that the PLB used to conduct its assessment as a baseline for future 
vulnerability assessments, all 33 ports in Group one could have completed a vulnerability 
assessment for under $1 million or 1.03 percent of the FY2012 budget. Kramek hits the 
point home: “The cost of conducting cyber vulnerability assessments appears to be 
relatively low compared to the costs of a successful attack.”154 
FY2015 and FY2016 both saw allowances for $100 million, according to 
FEMA’s allowance for PSGP funds. DHS’s Port Security Grant Program directive in 
FY2016 focuses spending on “supporting increased port-wide maritime security risk 
management; enhancing maritime domain awareness; supporting maritime security 
training and exercises; and maintaining or reestablishing maritime security mitigation 
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protocols.”155 The directive stresses that monies from the fund should be used toward 
maritime domain awareness though nowhere does it say how much or what percentage of 
monies should be used toward this purpose.  
C. EUROPEAN UNION MARITIME CYBERSECURITY COMPARISON  
The European Union (EU) has similar issues in cybersecurity like the United 
States. In 2010, The Digital Agenda for Europe promoted the unification of maritime 
cybersecurity to the EU by “focusing on prevention, preparedness and awareness, as well 
as develop effective and coordinated mechanisms to respond to new and increasingly 
sophisticated forms of cyberattacks and cyber-crime.”156 In 2011, the European Network 
and Information Security Agency (ENISA) conducted an analysis on member states' 
cybersecurity in a report called Analysis of Cyber Security Aspects in the Maritime 
Sector. The purpose of ENISA is to develop working relationships with the EU and 
member states while making best practices available for information systems and 
networks building resilience and security.157  
The maritime community in the EU is very similar to that of the United States in 
complexity, overall size, and dependence on open maritime facilities. Member states 
comprise 28 independent nations, 23 of which border waterways. Altogether, member 
states have 1,200 commercial and industrial ports with more than 8,100 flagged vessels, 
making up 30 percent of the world's shipping, and 40 percent of trade among member 
states travels through sea-lanes.158  
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Similar to Kramek’s findings in his report on U.S. port cybersecurity, the EU 
maritime industry as a whole has little awareness about maritime cybersecurity and the 
potential threats or actors aimed at disrupting EU supply chains. ENISA’s findings 
suggest that the EU maritime community has an incomplete understanding of the cyber 
threat, a lack of expertise in ICS systems and networks, security managers who maintain 
ad hoc protocols and responses to cyber-attacks, and little incentives or direct economic 
support from member-state governments.159 Like CyberKeel, ENISA admits, 
“Insufficient awareness and focus on cyber security results in a low sense-of-urgency 
combined with an inadequate preparedness regarding cyber risks.”160 
ENISA’s report provides evidence that maritime players in the EU are becoming 
more dependent on IT systems, and the lack of knowledge surrounding cyber threats is 
poor.161 Terminal operators establish Internet connectivity with information and 
communications technology (ICT) systems that require no connection to the Internet. 
Those systems connected to the Internet have little anti-virus protection or software 
providing forceful backup to the operators against cyber threats. Resiliency in maritime 
cybersecurity in the EU requires a joint strategy that requires all member states to adopt 
common goals in strengthening networks. According to ENISA, “Lack of coordination 
between stakeholders … (European and national) brings major discrepancies in the way 
maritime security is addressed.”162 The complexity of having multiple parties involved 
with cybersecurity and port operations is reflected through Kramek’s study of ports in the 
United States. Many of the issues visible in ENISA’s 2011 report and reflected in 
Kramek’s study show the international maritime community is at risk, thus putting the 
United States' national security at greater risk.  
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D. SUMMARY 
Kramek’s study was the first open-source cybersecurity vulnerability assessment 
of its time. For years, security managers in U.S. port facilities placed maritime 
cybersecurity training and planning on the backburner. The approaches from all five 
facilities had different staffs, programs, and software, as well as placed the responsibility 
at different levels. Evidence from the study shows, with the exception of the 842nd, not 
one single port as of 2013 had developed or even thought about a preplanned response or 
the after math of a cyber-attack.  
Upon its completion, some ports accepted the assessment as a warning and took 
advantage of funding opportunities to develop cybersecurity awareness programs. 
Although the amount of information provided in the study analyzes five specific U.S. 
ports, these ports are the bread and butter of American commerce and energy. Although 
positive steps have been made in some U.S. ports, not all of the ports have the same 
funding or perspective on maritime cybersecurity. In the end, potential attackers do not 
discriminate over who has funding, who has developed a preplanned response, or who is 
responsible for maintaining a secure network. 
According to the most recent studies, the EU and the United States have insecure 
maritime cyber domains. ENISA's concerns over internal maritime cyber security reflect 
issues that impact U.S. national security. Maritime cybersecurity starts before a foreign 
ship enters a U.S. port, and the international community must work together to protect 











IV. CYBERSECURITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 
 I fully expect that during my tenure as commander of the U.S. 
 Cyber Command there will be offensive activity directed against 
 critical infrastructure of the United States designed to damage, 
 destroy, or manipulate. 
   —Admiral Mike Rodgers, U.S. Cyber Command163 
 
Citizens of the United States should feel a sense of security in the face of foreign 
threats because of the layers of defense the United States has developed to thwart 
potential aggressors. Federal, state, and local authorities all have certain responsibilities 
for maintaining a safe world to live in while maintaining routine operations in the realm 
of physical security, once a wall is penetrated; someone notices the breach and responds 
to the threat. The cyber community is much different. Although the federal, state, and 
local authorities have a role in physical security based on laws of the land, it is unclear 
how capable or willing these agencies are to deter and respond to cyber threats.  
First, this chapter examines the USCG's responsibilities for maritime 
cybersecurity in the United States. Second, it reviews other supporting authorities of 
maritime cybersecurity. Third, it reviews the European Union (EU)'s cybersecurity 
policies. Fourth, it compares the EU’s cybersecurity program to that of United States 
through a real-life scenario. Finally, it compares the cybersecurity responsibilities of the 
United States and the EU.  
A. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD CYBER OPERATIONS  
Under PPD 21, the USCG is granted the authority and responsibility of the 
maritime transportation sector as it pertains to cybersecurity. To address different aspects 
of the cyber realm and players in the maritime community in the United States, the 
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National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) appoints the Coast Guard in charge of 
defending the Marine Transportation System (MTS) from all cyber threats. The Coast 
Guard Office of Port and Facility Compliance (CG-FAC) is the lead agency for marine 
transportation system (MTS) cyber-security. The United States Maritime Administration 
(MARAD) defines MTS as “waterways, ports, and inter-modal land-side connections that 
allow the various modes of transportation to move people and goods to, from, and on the 
water.”164 CG-FAC “serves as the Executive Secretariat representing the CG as the 
Sector Specific Agency for the Maritime Mode within the larger transportation Systems 
Sector. …CG-FAC will provide policy and guidance … to establish a consistent and 
effective approach to cybersecurity.”165 In January 2015, CG-FAC invited members of 
the maritime community to a meeting to discuss new projects pertaining to maritime 
cybersecurity. The meeting, held in Washington, D.C., had representatives from the 
USCG's, vessel operators, academics, port operators, and others with joint interests in the 
MST. CG-FAC also leads the Protect Infrastructure Cyber Strategy Implementation 
Team (CSITT), which consists of members from all over the Coast Guard in direct 
support of maritime cybersecurity. CG-FAC put pressure on the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) to work in unison with the maritime community to maintain overall 
resilience. CG-FAC sends out monthly notices to the maritime community in the United 
States with links to cybersecurity awareness bulletins, training, tools, and alerts. CF-FAC 
continues to promote policy development, training, resource allocation, and research in 
the maritime cyber sector. 166 
The USCG adapted three cyber security priorities in its 2015 Cyber Security 
Strategy: defending cyberspace, enabling operations, and protecting infrastructure. The 
Coast Guard, while working with other partners in cyber defense in the United States, 
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utilizes its intelligence teams to collect and analyze data that pertains to potential cyber-
attacks on the Coast Guard or the MTS.  
1. Defending Cyberspace  
The first priority of the Coast Guard is to defend cyberspace from potential 
adversaries. To meet this objective, the Coast Guard lists three specific goals: to “identify 
and harden systems and networks, understand and counter cyber threats, and increase 
operational resilience.”167 The Coast Guard makes use of its resources to manage the 
cyber threat in the United States through gathering intelligence, developing partnerships 
with sister agencies, monitoring system networks, improving training- and technology-
based focus groups, updating facilities with the most recent threat postures, and creating 
mitigation plans. Defending cyberspace for Coast Guard systems and the MTS is 
extremely difficult and requires joint support of Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and Department of Defense (DOD) assets. Coast Guard is working toward 
partnerships with customs and border protection, customs enforcement, immigration, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Energy.168 Sharing best 
practices among different federal agencies provides comparative information for the 
Coast Guard's planning. With the vast number of threats and actors in the maritime 
domain, the Coast Guard has focused a great deal on training and staying ahead of the 
problem to defend cyberspace.169 
2. Enabling Operations  
The two goals of enabling operations are to “incorporate cyberspace operations 
into mission planning and execution, and [to] deliver cyber capabilities to enhance all 
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missions.”170 The Coast Guard's unique role as both an intelligence asset and a law 
enforcement agency create unique opportunities to protect the maritime cyber realm. 
According to the Coast Guard's 2015 Cyber Strategy, “The Coast Guard will leverage 
approaches, processes, tools, and authorities that will maximize our effectiveness 
amongst—and against—diverse and sophisticated adversaries in the cyber domain”171 
While maintaining a resilient cyber domain for maritime operations in the United 
States, the Coast Guard enables its commanders the capabilities and assets necessary for 
maritime cybersecurity. One of the most crucial assets the Coast Guard has at its 
disposable is cyberspace operation personnel who are specifically trained for cyber 
missions. These personnel are recruited and trained to “create a professional cadre with 
specialized skills in cybersecurity, cyber intelligence, cyber law enforcement missions, 
cyber support to critical infrastructure, and cyber … operations.”172 Specialists in the 
field are responsible for safety, security, and cyber resilience of the MTS.  
3. Protecting Infrastructure 
The MTS has critical infrastructure in the United States that requires security 
systems throughout in order to maintain the security and prosperity of the American 
maritime system. The Coast Guard accepts the burden of protecting the maritime 
infrastructure and the MTS during cyber threats, natural disasters, and kinetic attacks. 
The two goals of protecting infrastructure include “risk assessment—promote cyber risk 
awareness and management, and prevention—reduce cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the 
MTS."173 The Coast Guard's main efforts reside in the relationships it establishes with 
civilian components working together to prevent cyber threats.  
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4. Summary 
The Coast Guard is responsible for overall maritime cybersecurity in the United 
States. Balancing both military operations and civilian-side cybersecurity, the Coast 
Guard has an enormous responsibility toward national security and the cyber realm. 
Because the task is so great, outside federal and civilian agencies must work together 
with the Coast Guard to maintain cyber resilience.  
B. SUPPORTING AUTHORITIES OF MARITIME CYBERSECURITY  
The lead agency responsible for maritime cyber security within the United States 
is the DHS through the USCG. The Coast Guard cannot do the job alone and relies on 
outside partnerships that it develops among sister agencies in the U.S. government. These 
partnerships are crucial for maintaining order in all aspects of the maritime community. 
Furthermore, groups, such as the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis 
Center, the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team, the Industrial Control 
Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team, and the National Infrastructure Coordination 
Center, are all on standby to support the maritime domain in the United States with any 
means necessary.174 These agencies work through parent departments in DHS, not only 
in times crisis but also for prevention. 
1. Federal Bureau of Investigation and Cybersecurity  
Along with giving the Coast Guard authority to uphold cybersecurity in the 
maritime domain, PPD 21 grants privileges to the FBI to maintain cyber resilience 
throughout the United States. In 2003, the FBI created its cyber division and placed cyber 
warfare as the FBI’s number three national priority, behind counterterrorism and 
counterintelligence.175 The FBI specifically “collects, analyzes, and disseminates 
domestic cyber threat information to interagency partners and the private sector.”176 
According to the FBI, billions of dollars are lost annually because cyber threats target 
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crucial infrastructure and systems on which many rely. To fully embrace the cyber threat, 
the FBI has created different programs and partnerships with law enforcement agencies 
across the United States, including a cyber division at FBI headquarters, cyber squads 
working out of 56 different field offices, cyber action teams deployable anywhere in the 
United States, computer crimes task forces working with state and local authorities on 
cybercrimes, as well as DOD and DHS support.177  
a. The FBI and Coast Guard Relationship  
Conducting exercises builds the foundation on which a maritime cyber threat can 
be defeated. FBI and Coast Guard authorities participate in joint exercises throughout the 
year to better their efforts against cyber threats, build teamwork and unity, and train with 
the latest techniques. Better insight into one such exercise is provided by Supervisory 
Special Agent Richard Kolko of the FBI's Cyber Division. Kolko outlines an actual drill 
in which Coast Guard and FBI agents disrupt a cyber-attack:  
A team of FBI agents from the cyber task force and Coast Guard 
Investigative Service meet in a warehouse on the outskirts of a major port 
on the West Coast to review the operations plan for a search warrant to be 
served on a nearby shipping office. The warrant is based on a 
cybercriminal intrusion into the office’s computer system. The goal of the 
criminals in this scenario is to affect delivery of food shipments into the 
busiest port in the U.S. by hacking into the company’s network, which can 
impact  citizens through even a slight delivery delay.178 
 
The FBI–Coast Guard partnership is critical for supporting maritime cyber operations and 
preventing attacks. Cyber Division's Assistant Director Joseph Demarest explains that the 
exercise simulates the FBI's and Coast Guard's official response, which triggers 
collaborative responses at all levels of government.179  
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b. National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force  
Established by the FBI in 2008, the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force 
(NCIJTF) consists of more than 20 government agencies responsible for coordinating and 
integrating cyber-threat investigation services for national security.180 Figure 3 depicts 
the members of NCIJTF. 
 
Figure 2.  NCIJTF Members181  
What makes NCIJTF function is the ability of federal, state, and local authorities 
to work in unison. This union allows members to access the most up-to-date listing of 
cyber threats available through intelligence gathering and collaboration. Greg McAleer, a 
Secret Service agent in charge of cyber security states, “The NCIJTF uses a whole 
government approach—employing every tool in our arsenal to address the threat and 
                                                 
180 Federal Bureau of Investigation. “National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force.” Last accessed 
April 15, 2016. https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber/ncijtf.  
181 Source; Kolko, “Countering the Maritime Cyber Threat,” 59. 
 54
protect our infrastructure, financial systems, and intellectual property.”182 Success in 
national cybersecurity means joint cooperation. Joint cooperation includes outside 
agencies providing data for the maritime community. Although agencies in NCIJTF are 
focused on maintaining a cyber-resilient United States, the attention and efforts of these 
agencies may not always be focused specifically on maritime cybersecurity. Although 
this alliance and cooperation exists among federal agencies, it does not relieve the Coast 
Guard of its primary role and focus on the maritime realm.  
2. Critical Infrastructure Cyber Community  
As a direct result of Executive Order (EO) 13636, the DHS established a 
voluntary cyber community, creating opportunities for public and private owners of 
critical infrastructure in the United States. The program, known as C-Cubed, establishes a 
forum for its members that provides guidance and resources to address cyber risks. The 
program influences members of the public and private sector who seek out assistance 
from the DHS in direct support of cyber threats. C-Cubed “support[s] industry to increase 
cyber resilience, promote[s] cybersecurity framework awareness, [and] encourage[s] 
organizations to manage cybersecurity as part of an all-hazards approach to enterprise 
risk management.”183 
The focus of the program is on all aspects of cybersecurity in the United States, 
not just maritime cybersecurity. Companies providing water and energy or those 
responsible for maintaining air travel, for example, participate in the C-Cubed program to 
minimize risks. The program works as a one-size-fits-all approach for infrastructure in 
the United States in an effort to maintain an overall cyber-resilient nation.184  
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3. Summary 
Although there are outside entities that support the Coast Guard, particularly the 
FBI, the Coast Guard is still responsible for the overall maritime domain in the United 
States. The establishment of the NCIJTF as a cybersecurity forum is good for basic cyber 
support and strategy. Unfortunately, many of the federal agencies that make up NCIJTF 
have nothing to do with the maritime industry and, therefore, provide no benefit to 
maritime cyber resilience. If a massive coordinated cyber-attack on the United States 
were to take place, it is unclear where the maritime industry would fall on the priority list 
for restoring capabilities. While it is good practice to form interagency relationships, the 
Coast Guard should not rely solely on the FBI or members of the NCIJTF in an era that 
stresses national security.  
C. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CYBERSECURITY  
Joint cybersecurity efforts in the EU began in 2001, when the EU Commission 
implemented the Network and Information Security (NIS) policy. In 2006, the EU 
Commission released the Strategy for a Secure Information Society and in 2009, the 
Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) plan. These laws established the 
framework the EU upholds today.185  
Member states in the EU ultimately own responsibility for protecting individual 
network systems. ENISA, Europol, and the European Defense Agency (EDA) are the 
three main organizations responsible for coordinating cyber efforts for all the member 
states in the EU. ENISA responsibilities fall within network and information security, 
Europol focuses on the law enforcement aspect, and the EDA coordinates joint cyber 
defenses for the EU. With support from organizations at the national level, the EU 
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provides the most favorable responses, deterrence, and strategies possible.186 Figure 4 
depicts the hierarchy of the EU's cyber strategy.187 
 
Figure 3.  European Commission: The EU's Cybersecurity Roles 
and Involvement188  
1. Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union  
The Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union was signed into law on July 2, 
2013, providing guidance for short- and long-term strategies for the EU. The six 
strategies adopted by the EU are as follows:  
achieving cyber resilience; drastically reducing cybercrime; developing 
cyberdefence policy and capabilities related to the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP); develop[ing] the industrial and technological 
resources for cybersecurity;  establish[ing] a coherent international 
cyberspace policy for the European Union[;] and promot[ing] core EU 
values.189  
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The EU Committee understands the looming threats of cyber-attacks in the EU or 
in member states. These six strategies of the EU established a framework for national and 
state governments to manage their own cybersecurity responsibilities for themselves and 
the greater EU.  
First, achieving cyber resilience to the EU means the private and public sectors 
work together during the preparation phases and, if necessary, the response phases. To 
ensure the goal of cyber resilience is being met, the EU cybersecurity strategy requires 
computer emergency response teams (CERTs-EU) to coordinate prevention as well as 
support the private sector, which has little incentives or monetary allowances from the 
EU to develop or expand its cyber resilience. One of the first directives from the EU 
Committee is for ENISA to establish a voluntary certification program for IT specialists 
to determine the effectiveness of training and abilities of employees. Other priorities 
consist of creating cyber awareness month, organizing school training sessions, and 
inviting academics from member states to provide solutions for cyber problems. 
Awareness among the member states is vital in a cyber-resilient EU.190  
Second, the EU's economy suffers from cyber-attacks and criminal activity.191 In 
order to reduce cybercrime in the EU, member states have ratified the Council of Europe 
Convention on Cybercrime, an agreement that outlines rules and regulations for national 
cybersecurity crimes. This legislation mandates that a member state develop a cybercrime 
law-enforcement agency within its borders to defend and track down internal cyber 
criminals. The EU provides the funding for the member state to establish and maintain 
appropriate law enforcement agencies. The European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), a part of 
Europol, directs member states in best practices for reducing cybercrime.192  
Third, the EU recognizes cyber threats involve military, civilian, and government 
authorities working together to develop a responsive cyber-defense policy with 
corresponding capabilities. The EU recognizes the potential to work with members of the 
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North American Treaty Organization (NATO), to which a majority of the EU belongs. 
However, the strategy does not list what is an appropriate retaliatory measure based on a 
cyber-attack. The strategy provides little guidance as the information regarding EU 
cyber-defense strategies is most likely classified.193  
Fourth, the EU believes private-sector industry partners that develop technology 
for the cyber sector must be willing to make security a top priority for their own 
technologies to maintain resiliency in the EU. In order to ensure the private sector 
complies with the wishes of the EU Commission, incentives must be given to the private 
sector for demanding such security devices are standardized across the board.194 The 
Commission directs ENISA as well as investors in the public and private sectors to 
develop strategies and programs that are in line with the Commission's purpose.  
Finally, the Commission recognizes that although the EU has moved toward 
developing a more resilient cyber domain, without the support of the international 
community—including other nations, private industry representatives, and the public 
sector—the cyber domain will never be fully resilient. Specifically, relations with the UN 
and NATO, for example, will provide access to an international stage that enables 
proponents of multinational cyber-realm abilities to address issues.195 Recognizing the 
necessity for the international community to work together is critical for national security 
interests, not only in the EU but also in the United States.  
2. European Union Maritime Security Strategy  
The EU ratified the European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) in 
2014 as the primary framework for maritime security. Realizing that the maritime 
industry is an absolute necessity to the EU, member states united to ensure EU fleets, 
critical infrastructure, and the markets remain resilient. The EUMSS recognizes nine 
major threats to maritime security in the EU, including cyber-attacks. Although this 
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particular legislation covers a variety of threats, the legislation establishes five areas in 
which member states work together to remain resilient.196  
The five concentrations of EUMSS include external action; maritime awareness, 
surveillance, and information-sharing; capability development; risk management, 
protection of critical infrastructure, and crisis response; and maritime security research 
and innovation, education, and training.197 EUMSS goals are similar to those of the 
maritime cyber strategy of the EU; however, the EUMSS specifically focuses on the 
threats associated with the maritime domain. Each specific focus explains how member 
states will achieve sector-specific goals. The conclusion of EUMSS states,  
The Council, Member States, Commission and High Representative have 
developed this Strategy in a joined-up manner. This has been an efficient 
way of working that should continue, including all relevant stakeholders 
and actors both at EU and national level.198 
The main takeaway from the EUMSS is the ability for the member states to come 
together as one and agree on a strategy that benefits the EU as a whole, thus making the 
EU more resilient to maritime threats. The collective defense of the EU, through 
international rules and laws including UNCLOS and various legislations, creates a better 
positioned EU.  
D. REPORTING A MARITIME CYBER-ATTACK  
While working to establish governance and solutions for tomorrow's attacks 
today, the United States and the European Union have defined responsibilities and 
legislation to deal with potential threats. Although responsibilities are outlined, the 
authority to respond to such attacks seems unclear. The Coast Guard in the United States 
and Europol in the EU are the two agencies responsible for law enforcement in maritime 
cybersecurity. To determine whether these agencies could respond to a cyber-attack at a  
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moment’s notice, it is necessary to evaluate the reporting criteria of a cyber-attack. The 
following portion of this section presents a scenario in which the United States and  
Great Britain respond to a non–U.S. flagged commercial vessel and a non–EU flagged 
commercial vessel, respectively, at a distance of 14 nautical miles from shore. The 
captain has lost control of the engine, steering, and navigational equipment aboard  
his vessel, similar to the research conducted at the University of Texas. The vessel is  
a liquid natural gas (LNG) tanker traveling at best speed and cannot stop. Who does  
the captain call?  
The Coast Guard has no formal check sheet or pre-planned response for masters 
of vessels who find their systems hacked and unresponsive. Despite the efforts and 
legislation established in Washington, a master of a vessel would be left to deal with the 
situation using one of the following options: dropping anchor to stop the ship’s 
movement provided he has sufficient depth or manually overriding the ship’s sensors and 
IT system through mechanical means. Europol, like the Coast Guard, does not have an 
immediate response check sheet for mariners who find themselves under a cyber-attack 
on the open ocean, which leaves masters helpless.  
However, CERT-EU and the FBI have official online forms that members of the 
maritime community can submit to report a cyber-attack or phishing incident.199 These 
online forms allow users to complete an incident response that moves its way through the 
proper channels. Europol has its own dedicated website for cybercrimes in member 
states. However, the reporting criteria for each country are different. For example, when 
clicking on the link for Austria, the victim of a cyber-attack is directed to an email 
address without specific questions. When accessing the page for Germany, the link 
guides victims to a series of phone numbers to contact cyber specialists in Germany.200 
The real question is if a cyber-attack is taking place on a ship, how is the ships company  
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able to make an online report of a cyber-attack, assuming the ships network is 
compromised? Despite the push for a joint cyber strategy from the EU, member states 
have significantly different reporting criteria, and none have responses specifically for the 
maritime industry.  
E. SUMMARY 
Maritime cybersecurity and, thus, national security for the United States begins 
within the borders of the 50 states as well as within other nations around the world. 
Defeating and deterring maritime cyber-attacks in the United States require a joint 
comprehensive strategy, agreed upon by all members of the maritime community. The 
Coast Guard is primarily responsible for maritime cybersecurity, but evidence shows the 
Coast Guard would be limited in dealing with a call on a VHF radio from a master at sea 
who is under attack. The players involved in cybersecurity in the United States are 
countable, thus giving responsibility to everyone and fuzzy authority to no one in 
particular. Although the EU's collective security seems ideal, some member states still 
doubt the seriousness of a cyber threat or appear ignorant of such events, as mentioned in 
Chapter III. To date, no formal process or protocol has been established to provide 
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V. CONCLUSIONS  
The guardians of your company’s cybersecurity should be encouraged to 
network within the industry to swap information on the latest hacker tricks 
and most effective defenses.  
       —Nina Easton201  
 
The cyber realm for the maritime community is an iceberg waiting to hit the 
Titanic. Without proper foresight—and the ability for leaders in the maritime community 
to come to terms with their glaring cybersecurity vulnerabilities—it will only be a matter 
of time until a maritime cyber-attack affects national security in the United States. 
Although research has been conducted and different entities have identified threats to the 
maritime community, the examination revealed that cyber resilience in the United States 
has been taken lightly.  
This chapter evaluates the studies on maritime cybersecurity, in particular, 
focusing on the lack of cyber awareness and training within the community, the 
equipment vulnerabilities, and governance already in place. Next, it provides policy 
recommendations for both the United States and the international community to develop 
a conversation on a global maritime cyber strategy. Finally, it suggests areas for future 
research.  
A. EVALUATION OF THE MARITIME CYBER THREAT 
No two cyber-attacks are alike. When dealing with a vast domain of networks, 
systems, and equipment, criminals have their pick of vulnerable networks to infiltrate. It 
is the job of the private and public sectors in the United States to ensure the nation's 
waterways remain open.  
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1. Lack of Cyber Awareness and Training in the Community  
It is one thing for experts in the field of cybersecurity to understand the problem 
of cyber threats; it is another thing entirely to convince and educate operators at every 
level of the urgency to prepare for them. Both Kramek’s report and ENISA’s findings 
suggest that maritime cyber security was insufficient and in some cases, “nonexistent.”202 
The lack of understanding within the international community is concerning for experts 
who stress the importance of maritime cybersecurity. ENISA recommends cyber 
awareness trainings and campaigns that focus on all members in the maritime domain, 
including stevedores, terminal operators, and sailors, to broaden the understanding of the 
maritime community.203 The trainings and certifications can be conducted throughout the 
year as necessary by supporting government authorities that regulate and standardize the 
process.  Informing all maritime members of the challenges in cybersecurity could 
provide a first line of defense to prevent accidental cyber incidents by employees, as 
explained in Chapter III.  
2. Equipment Vulnerabilities and Backup Procedures  
The maritime community’s reliance on technology will continue to expand in the 
future. Technology is a boon for operators across different platforms who want to 
maximize efficiency and work output. Despite its benefits, technology has become a 
crutch for many members in the maritime community. In order to maintain equipment 
resiliency, the civilian maritime community must continue to teach celestial navigation, 
which relies on observing the position of stars rather than on using GPS to confirm a 
vessel's position.”204 The Merchant Marine Academy, located in Kings Point, New York, 
still teaches celestial navigation for its prospective third mates; and, the Naval Academy 
has begun to offer celestial navigation again as part of its curriculum after a ten-year 
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hiatus.205 Top officials at the Naval Academy understand that today, with the developing 
cyber threats in the maritime domain, that backup procedures like celestial navigation are 
crucial to resiliency. 
Radiofrequency navigation is no longer used in the United States. Developed 
during WWII, the long-range navigation (LORAN) system was an aid that used low 
frequency radio signals from a land base to help mariners determine their position at sea. 
The Coast Guard operated LORAN throughout the coastal waters of the United States 
until February 8, 2010. According to the Navigation Center of the Coast Guard, “as a 
result of technological advancements in the last 20 years, [LORAN] became an 
antiquated system no longer required by the armed forces, the transportation sector or the 
nation’s security interests.”206 Although LORAN no longer transmits signals out to sea, 
the Coast Guard should consider keeping LORAN stations operational with limited 
funding in case a cyber-attack renders GPS or other electronic aids to navigation useless. 
With the infrastructure already in place for these systems, a cost–benefit analysis of 
keeping the towers operational should be conducted.  
Manual backup procedures of networks must happen to ensure proper inventory 
control. The ability for a terminal to have hard copies of its inventory could provide 
shipping and receiving accurate information in case a cyber-attack takes place at the 
facility. CyberKeel states, 
Cyber resilience would include clear plans for alternate communication 
channels, alternate informational databases fully independent from daily 
systems as well as alternate tools and systems onboard vessels to ensure 
operations if normal systems are breached or jammed.207  
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As seen from the example of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), in 
which the complete inventory on hand was completely lost, the ability to have printed 
copies of inventory will cost very little but yield a larger return if needed. Cyber 
resiliency in the maritime community is almost prepared to maintain normal operations 
and limit cyber threats.  
3. Maritime Cybersecurity Governance in the United States    
The United States and the EU both have general legislation in place that 
establishes certain guidelines for the maritime communities inside their borders. The 
United States has given authority and responsibility to the USCG for cybersecurity 
incidents, and the EU has given ENISA, EUROPOL, and the EDA different 
responsibilities for ensuring cyber resilience within the EU’s borders. However, both the 
United States and the EU lack a common approach and do not have a standard for 
cybersecurity regulation. The lack of regulation in the EU and in the United States is a 
cause for concern over how secure U.S. ports are from cyber-attacks.  
The Coast Guard has the support of the NCIJTF in matters of cybersecurity; 
however, one needs to question how responsive or useful NASA, for example, would be 
toward maritime cybersecurity or where maritime cybersecurity falls within the grand 
scheme of a multi-infrastructure cyber-attack in the United States. The complexity of the 
NCIJTF with 19 different players involved seems to be inappropriate for maritime 
cybersecurity. The United States should acknowledge network and information security, 
law enforcement, and defense in the maritime cyber community as three different entities 
reporting to one superior in order to maximize capabilities and resiliency.  
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MARITIME COMMUNITY  
Although many issues have come to light in the research of maritime 
cybersecurity, experts in the field offer solutions for how to establish and maintain a 
resilient cyber infrastructure for the maritime community. In order for these 
recommendations to benefit the national security of the United States, the U.S. 
government as well as private and public sectors involved in the maritime community 
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must agree that the United States has a maritime cyber problem, which must be resolved 
before disaster strikes.  
One of the biggest critics of maritime cybersecurity in the United States is 
Kramek. Based on his criticisms, Kramek makes useful policy recommendations for 
Congress, DHS, and PSGM administrators; the Coast Guard; and terminal owners, 
operators, and their respective security officers. First, Kramek recommends that Congress 
conduct its own study and set forth requirements for the Coast Guard through specific 
legislation that grants authority to establish an inspection team. Second, Kramek 
recommends that DHS and PSGM administrators dedicate funding based on the cyber 
threats listed in this thesis to strengthen cybersecurity in the United States. Third, Kramek 
recommends the Coast Guard engage all sectors of the maritime community, including 
the IMO, in a global campaign to raise awareness and to enforce cybersecurity standards. 
Finally, Kramek recommends that terminal owners, operators, and their respective 
security officers conduct vulnerability assessments, establish preplanned responses for 
their specific cybersecurity needs, and request additional funding for implementing 
cybersecurity requirements.208 
ENISA’s analysis concludes with goals for the EU and is broken up into short-, 
mid-, and long-term priorities. First, short-term priority recommendations encourage 
discussions among members of the maritime community in the EU on maritime cyber 
issues in an attempt to raise awareness and develop best practices. Second, mid-term 
policy priorities recommend that cybersecurity trainings are conducted throughout the 
maritime industry and that the EU develop specific roles for member states, so they 
participate in the joint efforts of EU cybersecurity. These roles and other rules affecting 
EU cybersecurity postures would be established in new legislation agreed upon by the 
EU maritime community. Finally, ENISA recommends that the EU enforce the 
regulations established by the maritime community and work toward an international 
approach for a unified cyber strategy that all signatory nations would abide by.209  
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Throughout CyberKeel’s white paper, recommendations for policy changes 
consistently appear. One of the major concerns experts at CyberKeel noted was the 
overall lack of honesty in reporting cyber-attacks on the global maritime community.210 
The maritime community must be open about cyber-attacks within their areas for two 
main reasons. First, once the community is aware an attack has taken place, other 
terminals, vessels, or ports can work to strengthen their defenses against similar attacks. 
Second, when a member of the maritime community reports a cyber-attack after it takes 
place, instead of keeping the information of the attack private, it should seek out advice 
from security firms across the United States—whose sole purpose is to develop lessons 
and procedures for restoring systems or deterring attacks in the first place. Because ports 
of different tiers in the United States receive different amounts of funding, the ability for 
a small port to access lessons learned from a larger port may come in useful when 
fighting off potential cyber-threats. CyberKeel is developing a forum to establish trust 
and openness among members to unite the maritime industry toward cybersecurity best 
practices.211  
 
Others have come forward stating that the maritime community must take action, 
focus resources, and develop strategies for securing the maritime cyber community. In 
March 2016, the Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA) made many similar 
recommendations to those of Kramek, ENISA, and CyberKeel many years earlier. Some 
of OCIA's recommendations include cyber strategies, vulnerability assessments, 
workplace trainings that cover the threats of phishing scams and the need for frequent 
password updates, as well as manual electronic data backup.212 That the same 
recommendations have been made before validates the seriousness of the maritime cyber 
realm.  
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National security and cybersecurity in the United States must take a universal 
approach through the IMO as recommended previously by ENISA.  Assuming the United 
States takes a progressive step toward awareness, vulnerability assessments, and 
cybersecurity funding, the nation will always be at risk for a maritime cyber-attack if the 
international community cannot enforce a global standard. Global maritime governance is 
ultimately required for the maritime cybersecurity of each nation.  
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
This thesis serves as the cornerstone for recommendations among the maritime 
community and governing bodies in the United States. With the limited information 
available on U.S. maritime cybersecurity, this thesis evaluated U.S. policies and ports 
against those of the European Union. Another possible approach toward evaluating 
cybersecurity in other nations around the world is through a standardized assessment 
conducted by an international organization, preferably, the IMO. Success in maritime 
cybersecurity and, thus, national security extends beyond the territorial waters of the 
United States. In order to achieve success, the international community, including 
decision makers in Washington, must agree upon international governance, protocols, 
and legislation. While this thesis compared top-tier ports in the United States and 
evaluated each port's ability to respond to cyber threats, the same kind of data was not 
available for EU port facilities. The ability for a standardized evaluation will address the 
same concerns on an even playing field across all maritime nations. These standardized 
checklists can be used to evaluate a port's status at any time for both self-assessment 
purposes and for more formal inspections.  
Further comparisons should be made between maritime nations in the European 
Union. Although this thesis applies broad information regarding maritime cybersecurity 
to the United States and the EU as a whole, research should be conducted for nations 
outside this sample to further evaluate how maritime nations address cybersecurity. If 
other maritime nations have stronger maritime cyber strategies than those of the United 
States or EU, the strategies should be evaluated in a U.S. policy directive to serve the 
national security interests of Washington. 
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